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Those who desired that there be meaningful discussion of the
Presidency in our constitutional system this bicentennial year cer-
tainly could not have anticipated the assistance they would be of-
fered by the President and the Congress. Congress and the
President not only provided some funds for bicentennial festivities,
but they also provided controversy for our constitutional celebra-
tion as well.
The Iran-Contra controversy, the Persian Gulf reflagging, the
ABM-SDI debate, the independent counsel controversy, even the
recent nomination of Judge Bork to replace Justice Powell on the
Court-these are a few controversies which seem to have been
crafted in Hollywood for constitutional celebration and released just
for this occasion. Each one grabs our attention and demands that
we think about the role and power of the President.
And this is all to the good. For the bicentennial celebration
should be so much more than firecrackers and flags. We must take
this opportunity to review the recurrent constitutional controversies
and gain a deeper understanding of what must be done to reach and
exceed our constitutional aspirations.
Certainly, a discussion of the Presidency is timely. I can under-
stand the sentiments of those who want to see the Presidency
strengthened.
In this day of international satellite coverage, we are very much
aware of the foibles and tyrannies that characterize so many of our
chief executives around the world. The technology we possess not
only exposes the President to immediate domestic scrutiny, but to
international scrutiny as well. Those who would like to strengthen
the Presidency-and silence those who criticize him-point to the
tough problems we face and the need for a strong Chief Executive
to tackle them. Surely, they say, the world will not respect a Presi-
dent who is being criticized at home and who must consult and
bicker with his Congress rather than take decisive action.
We have a lot of pride; we prefer not to send our figurative
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emperor out into the world naked, but rather clothed in the une-
quivocal support of his government. These are natural and sensible
concerns in a nuclear age, but, as the vain emperor must have
learned, there is more to being a head of state than new clothes and
appearances.
We should not ignore what the framers wanted when they
crafted this Presidency during the summer of 1787. They lived in
the age of monarchs, so they understood at least one model of gov-
ernment. And before the ratification of the Constitution, under the
Articles of Confederation, executive functions had been carried out
under the close supervision of the United States Congress. The Ar-
ticles' arrangement provided complete accountability and was ac-
ceptable in the context of a government which ceded little authority
to the central government.
But when the framers adopted the Constitution under which we
now live, they dramatically increased the powers of the central gov-
ernment. The inclusion of a President in the three-branch system
presented a special challenge. The framers wanted a President who
would be independent and accountable. If too weak, he would be,
they feared, the object of legislative tyranny. If too strong, he might
be tempted by monarchy. The short of it is that they arrived at an
arrangement, which, through structure and an enumeration of pow-
ers, sought to accomplish these two goals.
How did they do it? First, we have a Presidency that is a sepa-
rate branch of government elected by the people.' The structure,
therefore, provides for a separate institution and a national constitu-
ency. Second, we have a President who has an enumerated list of
powers that are his to exercise,' and a specific term that can be
shortened only by impeachment,' disability, or death.4 These ar-
rangements give the President a measure of independence.
But the President is accountable through a variety of other con-
stitutional arrangements. Impeachment is a possibility,5 however
remote. There is an obligation to faithfully execute the laws6 and
the possibility of judicial review should the President overlook his
legal obligations and restrictions. Congress possesses the power to
I. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2. Id. at § 2.
3. Id. at § 4.
4. Id. at § 1.
5. Id. at § 4.
6. Id. at § 6.
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fund the government,7 as well as the bulk of legislative powers
under the Constitution.' In addition, the Congress possesses broad
powers to make all laws necessary to carry into effect their own pow-
ers and "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."9 Congress thus possesses and exercises the power to
breathe life into the government-including the Presidency-and to
fund it in a meaningful way. In a worst-case scenario, Congress
could bring an errant President to his knees.
So, under our constitutional system the President is independ-
ent to a degree. But he cannot operate in an extra- or unconstitu-
tional manner without the cooperation of the Congress and the
acquiescence of the courts. The President needs the cooperation of
the Congress to authorize and fund his initiatives."0 Congress and
the President need the cooperation of the courts to enforce their
legislation. The courts need the cooperation of the President and
Congress to fund their operations and enforce their judgments.
We should understand the phrase "checks and balances" as a
shorthand for the structural arrangement that encourages each
branch to jealously guard incursions into its own authority. Our be-
lief in "checks and balances" is a belief in the idea that each branch
will be encouraged to moderate excessive claims of power due to
the necessity of cooperation and the reality of interdependence.
Those who want a "strong" Presidency complain about this ne-
cessity for cooperation and this reality of interdependence. They
say that the President under our constitutional system is straitjack-
eted, unable to meet the challenges of the modern international
order.
Well, there is some truth to this claim under our Constitution.
The courts have placed some limitations on the exercise of Presi-
dential power, but these limitations are neither extensive nor crip-
pling but rather consistent with the idea of a limited constitutional
government. The President cannot usurp a power which belongs
solely to another branch," and the President cannot act against the
will of Congress when Congress has expressed that will in legisla-
tion.' 2 The President has some flexibility to act when there is a long
7. Id. at art. I, § 7.
8. Id. at § 8, cl. 18.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877).
12. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
1987]
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and unbroken history of congressional acquiescence in particular
Presidential conduct.' 3 The President, however, cannot define and
extend his powers so expansively as to undercut the other branches,
and he must respect the decisions of the Supreme Court. 4
So there are some limitations, but they are so broadly conceived
that they leave a great deal of room for an activist President. More
importantly, they are sensible limitations given the separation ar-
rangements we have chosen. It is tough to make the case that a rea-
sonably popular President who respects the legislative process can't
do his job under our system.
Moreover, there are a few bonuses that go along with being
President. The President oversees a budget of billions, commands a
powerful army, presides over the execution of thousands of laws,
many of which afford him a great deal of discretion to fill in details
which Congress cannot. This discretion is especially marked in the
arena of foreign policy, where Congress rarely enjoins and requires,
but rather urges, senses, and permits.
Although Congress clearly has the power to make the laws, the
President is the beneficiary of an extremely broad doctrine of dele-
gation.' -5 Congress must often legislate broadly for a number of
reasons. A problem may be so complex that Congress can agree on
a broadly conceived plan to solve it, but not on the details of the
solution. Or, due to disagreements among members, it is often im-
possible to achieve the required congressional consensus if spon-
sors insist on details troublesome to some members. Whether
Congress legislates broadly or specifically, there is always detail to
be fleshed out, implementation to be achieved.
The President has the duty to execute the laws.' 6 This duty is
also an extremely broad power because of the kind of statutes Con-
gress passes, ofttimes ambiguous or vague. Congress, in essence,
gives to the President policymaking authority. Those who complain
that the President is weak do not mention this duty and power.
There are times, difficult times, when the President wants to do
something that Congress will not authorize, or when the Congress
wants to do something that the President will veto. These are messy
times, especially when the President or his representatives have as-
13. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter.J., concurring). Seealso Dames & Moore v. Regan. 453
U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974).
15. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1982); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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sured domestic or foreign interests that there would be "no con-
gressional problem."
The reality is that when a President feels so strongly about
something that he vetoes the legislation, the President usually gets
his way. In our country's history, there have been only 1,404 vetoes
(excluding pocket vetoes where the President always gets his way)
and only 102 overrides.17
Surely, this record speaks of strength, not weakness. There's
certainly one group of public servants who think the Presidency is a
reasonably attractive job.'8 Unless someone drops out of the Presi-
dential campaign soon, there will be barely enough room on any
stage for a Presidential debate. There must be some reason why all
these folks want to be President. A sane man or woman would not
spend millions to occupy an office which embodies no power.
I do admit that it is certainly more difficult to make and carry
out a policy when there are 535 people who must be consulted and a
pesty press, besides. Professor Schlesinger argues that delay may
produce better policies and so there is some benefit despite the
inconvenience.
I agree that the policies which are born of legislative give-and-
take are better, but not in any objective sense of the word better.
They are better in the constitutional sense. Better because they are
less likely to transgress constitutional limitations. Better because
the supporters have garnered a consensus, fifty-one percent or two-
thirds; thus, their implementation is less likely to divide and weaken
the Nation and thereby jeopardize the constitutional enterprise.
The need for consensus certainly would appear all the more ob-
vious in the foreign affairs arena where external commitments in a
nuclear age have the potential to eliminate the entire constitutional
enterprise. Yet it is in this context that the argument is most stri-
dent for independent authority.
There is a great deal of folklore about a constitution which
gives the President the sole authority to make foreign policy. But
there is little constitutional substance to such an idea-just look at
your Constitution-and the few cases on the foreign affairs powers
of the Presidency don't lend the claim of sole authority much
support.
The favorite case of the sole-authority proponents is United
17. U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES, 1789-1976, at ix (1978 &
Supp. 1977-1984 (1987)).
18. See Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1987, at A3, col. I; id., Apr. 21, 1987, at A19, col. 1.
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States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. "9 That case, however, involved an
exercise of Presidential authority pursuant to a grant of congres-
sional power, not an exercise of sole authority. Likewise, the Steel
Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2° does not help
the sole-authority advocates since it disapproved a plant seizure un-
dertaken to shore up the Korean War effort. Finally, a more recent
case, Dames & Moore v. Regan,2 1 approved President Carter's seizure
of-Iranian assets, but on the theory that Congress had authorized
and acquiesced in the specific action, not because the President has
sole authority.
Nevertheless, members of Congress and Presidents believe the
myth of sole Presidential authority. The myth retains its life because
enormous popular support for a Presidential action that arguably
transgresses law may make it difficult for the congressional opposi-
tion to mobilize. In cases like this, e.g., Grenada, members of Con-
gress will side with the President, and those who question the
wisdom and constitutionality of the action come to sound like voices
crying in the wilderness. The result is that there is no majority to
challenge the legitimacy of the Presidential action, to sharply pose
the question of Presidential authority.
The courts have not rendered many decisions which would help
to clarify Presidential and congressional foreign policy authority,
and they have often avoided these issues on a number of grounds.
Consequently, Congress and the President are left to their compet-
ing claims, and in the absence of forceful congressional action the
myth of sole authority lingers and lives.
In addition, legislation like the War Powers Resolution,22
though significant, may not be specific enough to foreclose all pos-
sibilities of unilateral Presidential action. For example, the War
Powers Resolution says that "nothing in this resolution is intended
to alter the constitutional authority of ... the President."23 After
President Carter attempted to rescue the hostages, he said that this
phrase meant that Congress had acknowledged unilateral Presiden-
tial authority to rescue American hostages.24 Unless Congress
amends the legislation to remove discretion in areas where the Pres-
19. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
20. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
22. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
23. Id. at § 1547(d)(1).
24. COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
303, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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ident may encroach on congressional authority, the President may
have both the argument of independent authority as well as the ar-
gument of congressional acquiescence in that authority.
But if one looks closely, one will find that Congress has been
steadily chipping away at the myth of sole authority. There are, in
fact, statutes which regulate foreign affairs and foreign commerce,
some more deferentially than others. Certainly, the Iran-Contra
hearings and their review of the law applicable to those transactions
show that Congress has not accepted the myth, even where se-
crecy-one of the most frequently offered arguments for sole au-
thority-is relevant. The ABM-SDI dispute certainly raises
questions about the myth of sole authority.2 5 Further, the recent
override of President Reagan's veto of the South African sanctions
bill 6 and the Senate debate on the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers2 7
should have burst the myth with some force.
But myths die hard. As Justice Jackson said in the Steel Seizure
Case: "We may say that the power to legislate belongs in the hands
of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slip-
ping through its fingers."28 Congress has begun to heed Justice
Jackson's admonition in the arena of foreign policy. And our for-
eign policy and our constitutional system will be the stronger for it.
CONCLUSION
From what I have said, you can see that I do agree with Profes-
sor Schlesinger that the separation of powers, the three-branch ar-
rangement, is one of the good features of our constitutional system.
A parliamentary-prime minister arrangement might be more tidy,
but I'm not sure that such a system would produce more effective-
meaning accountable-government. Some thirty years ago Justice
Jackson answered the argument that the country would suffer if the
Court rejected assertions of inherent Presidential authority. He
said:
Executive power has the advantage of concentration in a
single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part,
making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In
25. See S. Res. 167, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S3140-45 (daily ed. Mar.
12, 1987). Senate Resolution 167 later became the subject of hearings.
26. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat.
1086 (1986) was vetoed on Sept. 26, 1986; the veto was later overridden.
27. 133 CONG. REC. S9124-36 (daily ed. July 1, 1987).




drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far over-
shadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye
and ear. No other personality in public life can begin to
compete with him in access to the public mind through
modern methods of communications. By his prestige as
head of state and his influence upon public opinion he ex-
erts a leverage upon those who are supposed to check and
balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness.
Moreover, rise of the party system has made a signifi-
cant extraconstitutional supplement to real executive
power.... Party loyalties and interests ... extend his effec-
tive control into branches of government other than his
own and he often may win, as a political leader, what he
cannot command under the Constitution .... I cannot be
brought to believe that this country will suffer if the Court
refuses further to aggrandize the Presidential office.... ."
I, like Justice Jackson, also refuse to believe that this country
will suffer unless we defer more to our President, unless we write
him a blank check on our constitutional account. His powers are
both great and flexible, but there are limitations. The major limita-
tion on Presidential power is the one we cannot reject and be true to
our ideal of limited government-that he remain a President under
the law, not above it.
In the midst of the firecrackers and flags, we should not forget
what we have to celebrate in the American Presidency. We should
celebrate the fact that we have not seriously embraced the idea of
the imperial Presidency. More importantly, we should celebrate the
fact that we, unlike so many other nations, have managed to have
our President and our Constitution too.
29. Id. at 653-54.
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